Every candidate on this site is waiting on a measurement, and this page
says exactly what the measurement is. Each block below gives the wording
of the question that would resolve one candidate, the follow-ups that
test whether support survives the costs and trade-offs being named, and
the bipartisan floor the result must clear before the proposal is
drafted. The wording is written to be forward-looking rather than tied to
any current officeholder, to describe a rule that applies to whichever
party holds power, and to name the mechanism rather than the slogan —
because a question that fails any of those three measures something other
than the proposal.
Anyone commissioning or fielding these should keep the wording as written
and report crosstabs by party. A topline without a party breakdown cannot
answer the question we are asking, which is whether support exists in
both parties at once.
Questions by candidate
Concept Strong; named age unpolled
Would you favor or oppose amending the Constitution so that no person who has reached the age of 75 may be elected to the House or Senate? The rule would apply to every future candidate of both parties, and no one currently in office would be removed before the end of their term.
Follow-ups
- Repeat the item at ages 70 and 80 to establish the curve
- Counter-argument in the same sample: 'some say voters should be free to elect anyone they judge capable, regardless of age'
Threshold 60% in both parties on a named age, with the counter-argument in the field
Anti-favoritism floor
Federalized Florida wording, 60% R
Should the Constitution provide that no congressional district may be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party — applying to every state and every future legislature, whichever party controls it?
Follow-ups
- Costs named, Citrin Center style: 'even if it means your party wins fewer seats in your state'
Threshold 60% Republican floor, surviving the costs-named follow-up without dropping below Moderate
Appropriations fidelity
Symmetric forward-looking poll clearing 60% R
Some propose a constitutional rule that any future president must spend the money Congress has appropriated — no more and no less — and may not withhold, delay, or cancel funds without Congress voting to change the law. This would bind future presidents of both parties equally: it would bar a president from freezing funds Congress approved, and equally bar a president from spending or forgiving money Congress never appropriated. Do you favor or oppose?
Follow-ups
- Costs named; the floor must hold within the Moderate band
Threshold 60% among Republicans; below 45% R rejects it on high-topline/low-floor and routes it to the statutory list
Regime-coded; operative remedy unpolled
Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment providing that career federal employees — those not appointed by the president — may be hired, promoted, and dismissed only on the basis of merit and conduct, and never because of their political beliefs or party, binding every future president of either party?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: 'even if this makes it harder for a president to remove career officials who are performing poorly or resisting lawful policy'
- Symmetry probe: ask the same of a president of the respondent's own party and of the other party
Threshold 60% in both parties on the base question and the costs-named follow-up, with less than a 10-point swing across the symmetry probe — and it must hold across an administration that changes hands
Strong but stale; existential test open
Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment providing that no government — federal, state, or local — may take a person's home, business, farm, or land in order to transfer it to another private owner for economic development, even if the owner is paid fair market value?
Follow-ups
- With the exceptions named: 'except to remove a specific danger to public health or safety, or for roads, utilities, and pipelines open to the public'
- Costs named: 'even if this means some redevelopment projects, stadiums, or shopping centers cannot be built'
- A Kelo re-ask in the 2005 wording, for a trend line
Threshold 60% in both parties on the exceptions-named and costs-named follow-ups
Strong floor; trade-off untested
Should the Constitution provide that no congressional district may be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party — applying to every state and every future legislature, whichever party controls it?
Follow-ups
- Costs named, Citrin Center style: 'even if it means your party wins fewer seats in your state'
Threshold 60% Republican floor on each of the two questions, surviving the costs-named follow-up without dropping below Moderate
Remedy unpolled since 2018
Should any future president be able to remove the Attorney General or FBI Director only for cause — such as misconduct or neglect of duty — rather than at will?
Follow-ups
- Should any future president be prohibited from directing the Justice Department to investigate or prosecute a specific person for reasons unrelated to law enforcement?
- An actor-named control arm, to price the 47-point wording effect
- Costs named: 'even if that means a president cannot remove prosecutors voters disapprove of'
Threshold 60% Republican support on the conduct-rule version and 55% on the removal version, surviving the costs-named follow-up
Regime-coded; forward-looking re-poll
Should the Constitution be amended to say that Congress may set fixed terms for members of federal regulatory commissions and may require a stated cause before any president removes them — a rule applying to every future president of either party?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: 'even if that means officials appointed by a previous president keep setting policy for years after an election'
- A cross-party roll call on a bill restoring for-cause protection would count as corroborating evidence
Threshold Republican floor at or above 60%, holding at or above the Moderate band under the costs-named follow-up; fielded no earlier than 2027 so it is not read in the immediate wake of the ruling
Unpolled nationally; existential test open
Some states allow more than one party to nominate the same candidate, so that a candidate can appear on more than one party's line and the votes are added together. Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment guaranteeing that right in every state — including for a new party to the right of the Republican Party and a new party to the left of the Democratic Party?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: ballots grow longer; the same candidate's name appears more than once; small parties may trade their nomination for policy concessions
- A state-constitutional ruling striking an anti-fusion law, or a fusion-restoring statute enacted with cross-party majorities in a state that currently bans it
Threshold Republican floor of 60% or better, holding at 55% R on the costs-named follow-up
Unpolled mandate; regime-coded
The Constitution should require the federal government to publish accurate and complete accounts of what it takes in, what it spends, and the size and condition of the population, on a regular schedule set by law.
Follow-ups
- Integrity guarantee, written behind the veil: 'The head of a federal statistical agency should be removable only for cause, and never because of the substance, conclusions, or timing of a statistical release — this rule would apply to every future president of either party.'
- Depth check: re-ask the integrity item after naming the cost — 'even if that means the president cannot replace an agency head whose numbers he believes are wrong'
Threshold 60% floor in the less-supportive party on both framings; the depth check must stay out of the Weak band
Narrowing executive immunity
Regime-coded; single-sourced campaign-window fieldwork
enacting a Constitutional amendment to make clear that no person is above the law, even the President of the United States
Follow-ups
- Re-ask outside a presidential campaign, with full party breakdowns published
Threshold 60% R on a re-ask of the USA Today/Ipsos amendment wording with full party breakdowns published, fielded outside a presidential campaign
Neutral districting authority
Constitutional and costs-named 'who may not draw' wording, 60% R
Should the Constitution require that the officeholders whose own districts are being drawn be barred from drawing them, in every state?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: 'even if it means your party wins fewer seats in your state'
Threshold 60% R, surviving the costs-named follow-up
Unpolled; statutory route open
Congress currently requires each House district to elect one member. Would you favor or oppose electing House members from larger districts that each choose three to five members, so that a party winning 40% of the vote in an area wins about 40% of that area's seats?
Follow-ups
- Costs-named follow-up naming larger districts, more parties in Congress, and coalition bargaining — not optional, because depth is the untested risk
- Statewide adoption of multi-member legislative districts by ballot measure, or any cross-party roll call
Threshold 60% in both parties, surviving the costs-named follow-up; none of this cures the why-an-amendment test, which needs its own answer
Symmetric appropriations poll unrun; sub-items gated separately
Some propose a constitutional rule that any future president must spend the money Congress has appropriated — no more and no less — and may not withhold, delay, or cancel funds without Congress voting to change the law. This would bind future presidents of both parties equally: it would bar a president from freezing funds Congress approved, and equally bar a president from spending or forgiving money Congress never appropriated. Do you favor or oppose?
Follow-ups
- A costs-named follow-up; the floor must hold within the Moderate band
- A cross-party roll call: any recorded vote in which majorities of both parties back a pocket-rescission ban
Threshold 60% among Republicans on the appropriations sub-item; at that result it folds into executive-compliance as the Appropriations Fidelity Clause
Unpolled; regime-coded proxies
Some people say the Supreme Court should be able to strike down a law passed by Congress and signed by the President only if at least six of the nine justices agree, instead of five. This rule would apply to any future Court and any future law. Do you favor or oppose it?
Follow-ups
- Priced: 'even if that meant a law five justices believed was unconstitutional stayed in force?'
- Replicate once after a change in the Court's appointing-party majority, or else the draft must carry a prospective effective date
- Coverage must be settled: federal statutes only is the sole version whose blast radius is defensible on current evidence
Threshold 60% in both parties on the priced version; below 45% in either party is a rejection on the floor
A provision drafted for
Lobbying
·
Standalone favor/oppose re-test clearing 60% in both parties
Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment providing that anyone who has served in Congress or in a senior federal office may never, at any time after leaving office, be paid to advocate before the federal government on behalf of someone else? The rule would apply to everyone who takes office in the future, from either party, and would not restrict anyone from petitioning the government on their own behalf or without pay.
Follow-ups
- Costs named: a former official who is an expert on an issue should not be barred for life from being paid to advocate for it, and a lifetime rule would discourage capable people from entering public service
- Head-to-head against the surviving clause: 'If the choice were between a five-year wait and a permanent ban, and both were equally likely to become law, which would you favor?'
- The unpriced scope split: a permanent ban limited to the specific matters a person personally worked on, with a five-year wait for everything else
- Anchor: carry the foreign-government item (2022 Q46 wording) in the same instrument
Threshold 60% in both parties on the core item, holding at 60% in both parties on the costs-named follow-up; below 45% in either party it should be re-filed as rejected
A provision drafted for
Privacy
·
Commissioned split-sample instrument: rights-in-the-data vs fiduciary-duty framings, each costs-named, each priced against an identical statutory companion
Would you favor or oppose adding to the Constitution a rule that companies collecting personal information may use it only for the purposes they stated, must keep it accurate and secure, and must let each person see, correct, and delete the information a company holds about them — with Congress and the states writing the enforcement rules?
Working draft — wording not yet finalised.
Follow-ups
- Split-sample framing arm (fiduciary): the identical item with the rule restated as duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality owed by companies collecting personal information as a condition of a service — like the duties a bank or a lawyer owes a client — with Congress and the states writing the enforcement rules
- Statutory companion, split-sampled against the core item to price the constitutional increment: the identical wording with 'adding to the Constitution a rule' replaced by 'a federal law requiring'
- Costs named: supporters say people should have rights over data companies collect about them no matter which party writes the laws, and that every attempt to pass this by statute has failed for thirty years; opponents say constitutional rules on businesses would burden small companies, raise the cost of free online services, and put judges in charge of how websites work
Threshold 60% in both parties on the costs-named core item, and the constitutional version within 10 points of the statutory companion — if constitutionalization costs more than 10 points, the public is endorsing the statute Section 3 already authorizes. Between framings, adopt whichever clears; if both, the rights-based text, which matches the article's Section 3 vocabulary. Below 45% in either party on both framings moves the clause to rejected with the statutory route noted.
A provision drafted for
Redistricting
·
Held back from Article 6 pending a party-split poll; four state ratifications justify commissioning the question, not un-holding the clause
Four states have added to their constitutions a rule that election district maps may not be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor any political party or any incumbent. Would you support or oppose adding the same rule to the U.S. Constitution?
Threshold Reopen for drafting at a 60% floor in the less supportive party; below 45%, record as tested and keep held
A provision drafted for
Ethics
·
Neutral both-parties polling on emoluments enforcement
The Constitution bars presidents and other federal officials from accepting payments or gifts from foreign governments, but courts have never ruled on whether anyone can sue to enforce that ban. Would you favor or oppose a constitutional amendment stating that this ban is enforceable in court — so that any future president of either party who accepts payments from a foreign government could be required to answer for it in a lawsuit?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: 'Supporters say a rule no one can enforce is not a rule. Opponents say it would let a hostile Congress or a state attorney general drag any president into court over ordinary business dealings.'
- Separating conduct from remedy, asked after the core item: 'Regardless of whether anyone should be able to sue, do you think it is acceptable or unacceptable for a president of either party to accept valuable gifts from a foreign government while in office?'
Threshold 60% in both parties on the core item, and 55% in both parties surviving the costs-named follow-up; below 45% in either party, or a drop of more than 15 points, moves it to rejected with a path back
A provision drafted for
Executive Compliance with the Courts
·
Three separate favor/oppose items, 60% floor each; must state who adjudicates after Trump v. Anderson
Suppose a federal court finds, after a full hearing and a final judgment, that a senior official in any future administration — of either party — has deliberately refused to obey a court order that applies to that official. Should that official be removed from office as a result, or should removal be left to the president and Congress to decide?
Follow-ups
- Item 2, pardon carve-out: 'Today a president may pardon someone convicted of contempt of court, including an official held in contempt for disobeying a court order. Should any future president be able to pardon a contempt-of-court conviction, or should contempt of court be outside the pardon power?'
- Item 3, salary suspension: 'If a federal court certifies that an official is deliberately refusing to comply with a court order, should that official's government salary be suspended for as long as the refusal continues, or should the salary continue to be paid?'
- Costs named, asked once after all three: some say a rule like this is the only way to make a court order mean anything against the government; others say it lets judges remove or defund officials the voters chose, over disputes about what an order actually required
- The tier trap, asked on item 1: 'Would your answer change if the finding came from a single district judge rather than from a final judgment upheld on appeal?'
Threshold 60% in both parties, on the costs-named version, item by item. A piece clearing 60R/60D is drafted as its own section; 45-59% in either party is held and re-tested; below 45% in either party drops to rejected-clause status. The three are severable, so a failure on one does not hold back the others.
A provision drafted for
Executive Compliance with the Courts
·
Unpolled; 60% floor in both parties on the costs-named item
Suppose a federal court finds, after a full hearing and a final judgment, that a senior official in any future administration — of either party — has deliberately refused to obey a court order that applies to that official. Should that official be removed from office as a result, or should removal be left to the president and Congress to decide?
Follow-ups
- Costs named, asked once after all three items
- The tier trap: 'Would your answer change if the finding came from a single district judge rather than from a final judgment upheld on appeal?'
Threshold 60% in both parties on the costs-named version
A provision drafted for
Executive Compliance with the Courts
·
Unpolled; separation-of-powers design unfinished
Today, the officers who carry out federal court orders — serving them, and enforcing them when someone refuses — work for the Justice Department, part of the executive branch. So when a court rules against the executive branch, the officers who would enforce the ruling report to the same branch the ruling is against. Some people say these officers should instead report to the courts, so that no future president can block enforcement of a ruling against his own administration. Others say officers taking orders from judges rather than elected officials would give courts too much power. Which comes closer to your view?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: 'If officers reporting to judges could arrest or detain senior executive branch officials — including, in principle, cabinet secretaries — on a judge's order, would you still favor moving them under the courts, or not?'
- The narrower variant, the clause's second sentence alone: officers stay in the executive branch but may not take direction about enforcing a court order from any official whose own conduct is the subject of that order
- Symmetry check: 'Would your answer be different depending on which party held the presidency?'
- Benchmark anchor, unreworded: Marquette's obey-the-Court item
Threshold A bipartisan floor of 60% on the core item, with the costs-named follow-up holding at 50% in both parties — both, not either
A provision drafted for
Limited Presidential Pardon Reform
·
Forward-looking both-parties wording on the coordination mechanism, not the 'allies' relationship
Suppose a future president — of either party — asks someone to commit a federal crime on the president's behalf, and that person is later convicted of it. Should the president be allowed to pardon that person, or should the Constitution prohibit a president from pardoning someone for a crime the president directed them to commit?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: opponents say a judge or jury would have to decide what a president secretly directed, which puts courts in the middle of the president's decisions and could tie up ordinary pardons in lawsuits
- Severed second limb: 'Should the Constitution prohibit a president from granting a pardon when the president is a direct beneficiary of the offense being pardoned?'
- Relationship replication, carried unchanged as the anchor: the verbatim YouGov May 2026 item on pardoning political allies
- Symmetry probe: the same core item in split samples, once naming no president and once as 'including presidents you voted for'
Threshold 60% in both parties on the core item, holding at 55% in both parties after the costs-named follow-up. Below 60% but at or above 45% in both parties keeps it a candidate and moves the drafting effort to the severed second limb. A repeat Weak reading moves it to rejected.
A provision drafted for
Executive Compliance with the Courts
·
Unpolled; 60% floor in both parties on the costs-named item
Today a president may pardon someone convicted of contempt of court, including an official held in contempt for disobeying a court order. Should any future president be able to pardon a contempt-of-court conviction, or should contempt of court be outside the pardon power?
Follow-ups
- Costs named, asked once after all three items
Threshold 60% in both parties on the costs-named version
A provision drafted for
Limited Presidential Pardon Reform
·
Reopened; one independent forward-looking replication clearing 60% R
Some have proposed adding a sentence to the Constitution reading: 'The President may not grant a reprieve or pardon to himself or herself.' This would apply to every future president, of either party, including presidents you vote for. Would you support or oppose adding this to the Constitution?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: supporters say no one should be able to pardon himself and that leaving the question unsettled invites a crisis no court has ever resolved; opponents say the Constitution may already forbid it, no president has ever tried, and amending the Constitution over a hypothetical is a poor use of the process
- Symmetry probe: the core item in split samples, one naming no president and one reading 'including a president of your own party who you believe was prosecuted unfairly'
- Norm anchor, carried unchanged: 'Do you think it is appropriate or inappropriate for a president to pardon themself?'
- Remedy anchor, carried unchanged: 'Would you support or oppose prohibiting a president from pardoning themself?' — the verbatim YouGov 6B/7B item, so the commissioned instrument extends the two-point series to three
Threshold 60% among Republicans and 60% among Democrats on the core item, holding at 55% in both parties after the costs-named follow-up. A 45-59% Republican result keeps it a candidate and argues for drafting it as a severable section, given the family ban already in the article reads 57% R. Below 45% among Republicans moves it back to rejected.
A provision drafted for
Executive Compliance with the Courts
·
Unpolled; 60% floor in both parties on the costs-named item
If a federal court certifies that an official is deliberately refusing to comply with a court order, should that official's government salary be suspended for as long as the refusal continues, or should the salary continue to be paid?
Follow-ups
- Costs named, asked once after all three items
Threshold 60% in both parties on the costs-named version
A provision drafted for
Term Limits
·
Drafting counsel, not a poll; the state-election-power half risks being read against the redistricting article
If the Constitution were amended to limit members of Congress to twelve years in each chamber, should those limits be the same in every state — so that no state could set a shorter limit for its own senators and representatives — or should each state be free to set stricter limits for the people it sends to Congress?
Follow-ups
- Costs named: a state that limits its members more tightly gives away seniority and influence in Congress to states that do not
- The savings half, asked separately and never bundled: 'Should an amendment on term limits also say that it does not change any other power states have over how elections are run?'
Threshold 60% in both parties on the uniformity half, sustained through the costs-named follow-up — though even clearing it would leave the drafting-counsel question, which is the one that governs