Candidate category · Strong but stale; existential test open
Eminent domain limits for private development
79% of Democrats and 85% of Republicans opposed the Kelo holding (Saint Index / UMass Lowell, 2005) and twelve state constitutions followed; the number is two decades old and the existential-problem test is open.
The proposal
In Kelo v. City of New London (2005), a 5–4 Court held that taking unblighted homes for a private redevelopment plan was a “public use” under the Fifth Amendment, reading “public use” as “public purpose.”1 Because the Takings Clause binds the states, that reading is the floor for every government.2 The amendment as commonly framed would define “public use” in the Fifth Amendment itself: no government may take private property to transfer it to another private party for economic development. State-record variants: a flat ban on private-to-private transfer (New Hampshire); a public-use definition with a health-and-safety blight exception (South Carolina, Texas); heightened compensation (Michigan).3
The evidence
The only independent national poll with a party breakdown is from the autumn after the decision: 81% of Americans opposed it — 85% of Republicans, 79% of Democrats, 83% of independents (Saint Index, 2005 — a land-use series fielded by the University of Massachusetts Lowell Center for Economic and Civic Opinion, sponsored by a consulting firm). Opposition was as flat across ideology as across party — 77% of liberals, 81% of moderates, 82% of conservatives — and 63% opposed strongly.4 The next year the same series found 71% supporting a ban on taking private property for private development, 43% strongly (Saint Index, 2006; no party breakdown published).5
The record otherwise agrees:
- Twelve states amended their constitutions by popular vote, 2006–2012; every clean measure — a private-transfer limit and nothing else — passed by wide margins, from Louisiana’s 54.8% to South Carolina’s 86%.6 Every failed measure (23.9% to 47.6%, 2006–2008) was bundled with regulatory-takings compensation or rent-control repeal.7
- The House passed the Private Property Rights Protection Act 376–38 in 2005 — Republicans 218–2, Democrats 157–36 — and three more times through 2018; the Senate never did.89
- The newest independent party split: 78% of Iowans opposed companies using eminent domain for carbon-capture pipelines — 72% of Republicans, 82% of Democrats, 79% of independents (Selzer & Co. for the Des Moines Register, 2023) — a proxy, since most Kelo reforms exempt common carriers.10
- An advocacy-commissioned poll adds a second party split: 95% disagreed with the ruling — 92% of Republicans, 94% of Democrats, 99% of independents (Zogby International for the American Farm Bureau Federation, 2005). That wording drops the public-benefit rationale the ruling turned on and reads fourteen points above the Saint Index. A six-state Midwestern survey found 81% opposed (Embold Research for Bold Alliance, 2024; no party breakdown published).11
We searched nine national pollsters and found no poll on this question since 2014 with a party breakdown.
Where it stands
The bipartisan floor is 79% of Democrats (Saint Index / UMass Lowell, 2005): Strong, with a six-point gap. It is two decades old; staleness is the test at risk. Nothing since suggests it moved — the ballot record ran to 2012 without decay — but nothing measures it.
The “everyone agrees because no one is thinking about it” test is now measured, and it cuts both ways. Two years after the decision, only 21% of Americans could correctly say whether their own state had passed a reform law, and only 13% both knew and could judge whether it worked (Saint Index, 2007; no party breakdown published).12 Attention is that shallow. The opinion under it is not: 63% opposed the ruling strongly in 2005, 43% backed a ban strongly in 2006, and taking “low value homes … to build a shopping center” was acceptable to 4% of New Jerseyans (Monmouth University, 2005; no party breakdown published).13 Depth under named exceptions and costs is untested nationally. Framing dependency is well measured: bundled measures ran 15 to 60 points behind clean ones.7 The only partisan split is on the federal remedy: House Democrats voted 39–157 on a 2005 funding-cutoff rider and 157–36 on the standalone bill.14
The symmetry test is met by construction — a public-use definition binds every government and every future majority — and reforms passed under legislatures of both parties: over a Democratic governor’s veto in Iowa, 90–8 and 41–8, with members of both parties on both sides, and over a Republican governor’s opposition in Mississippi.15 The why-an-amendment test has a precise answer: “public use” is constitutional text, so only the Court or an amendment can change its meaning, and the statutory substitute — a spending condition — has passed the House four times and never the Senate.9
The existential-problem test is open. Economic-development takings are rare; forty-three to forty-five states have reformed;16 the federal government binds itself by executive order;17 two sitting justices have asked the Court to reconsider Kelo (2021).18 Against that: the decision remains the federal floor; of the 36 legislatures that acted, 22 passed laws one published assessment grades largely symbolic, and the eleven states that reformed by popular vote produced the stronger ones; one state has never reformed and one rolled back;16 and this would restore a clause already in the Bill of Rights. Whether that is a threat to the country’s future or a policy preference is the question.
Framings we tested
The clean ban clears in every form asked: “prohibit government from taking private property for transfer to another private individual or business for economic development or increasing tax revenue” won 80.1% in Michigan (2006); public use with a health-and-safety blight exception won 86% in South Carolina (2006) and 81.0% in Texas (2009); owner-occupied homes only won 62.0% in California (2008).6 Ballots carry no party breakdown, but the states span red, blue, and purple. Two framings do not clear: the ban bundled with regulatory-takings compensation or rent-control repeal, rejected five times,7 and the redevelopment framing — “rebuild an area” — a 47%–39% plurality (Monmouth, 2005).13
What would move it
In: a national poll with party breakdowns on forward-looking, mechanism-specific wording — “no government — federal, state, or local — may take a person’s home, business, farm, or land in order to transfer it to another private owner for economic development, even if the owner is paid fair market value” — clearing 60% in both parties with exceptions (blight, common carriers) and costs (forgone redevelopment) named. That settles staleness; the existential-problem test would remain.
Out: a floor under 60% with exceptions and costs named (depth); a result turning on “rebuild an area” versus “homes for a shopping center” (framing dependency); or a finding that a problem this rare, and remedied this widely by the states, is a policy preference (the existential-problem test).
Sources
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Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (June 23, 2005), 5–4; the Court “embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose’” and noted that “nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” — Syllabus, Cornell LII; opinion of the Court; dissent. ↩
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The Takings Clause has applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment since 1897 — Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), Cornell LII. ↩
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New Hampshire CACR 30 (2006): “No part of a person’s property shall be taken by eminent domain and transferred, directly or indirectly, to another person if the taking is for the purpose of private development or other private use of the property”; North Dakota’s common-carrier exception; South Carolina, Texas, and Louisiana blight definitions; Michigan 125% and Rhode Island 150% compensation for residences; Florida’s ten-year no-transfer rule; Utah’s 2007 rollback — Institute for Justice, Enacted Legislation Since Kelo (advocacy source; state-by-state inventory). ↩
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Saint Index, Center for Economic and Civic Opinion, University of Massachusetts Lowell, Oct.–Nov. 2005: 81% opposed the Kelo decision — 85% R / 79% D / 83% I; 63% opposed strongly; by ideology, 77% of liberals, 81% of moderates, 82% of conservatives; also 77% of men, 84% of women, 82% of whites, 72% of African-Americans, 80% of Hispanics. Question wording: “The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that local governments can take homes, business and private property to make way for private economic development if officials believe it would benefit the public. How do you feel about this ruling?” — reported in House Report 113-357, House Report 115-859, and Somin, “The Limits of Backlash,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100 (2009), full text; SSRN abstract. ↩
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Saint Index, 2006: 71% supported reform laws banning “the taking of private property for private development,” 43% strongly; no party breakdown published. Topline on file with the author and cited through Somin, “The Limits of Backlash,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100 (2009), full text. ↩
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Certified results: South Carolina Amendment 7 (2006), 86%; New Hampshire Question 1 (2006), 85.66%; Georgia Amendment 1 (2006), 82.72%; Texas Proposition 11 (2009), 81.02%; Michigan Proposal 06-4 (2006), 80.09%; Virginia Question 1 (2012), 74.45%; Mississippi Initiative 31 (2011), 73.06%; Florida Amendment 8 (2006), 69.05%; North Dakota Measure 2 (2006), 67.49%; Nevada Question 2 (2006), 63.11% and (2008), 60.81%; California Proposition 99 (June 2008), 61.96%; Louisiana Amendment 5 (September 2006), 54.78%; index: Eminent domain on the ballot, Ballotpedia. ↩ ↩2
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California Proposition 90 (2006), 47.62%, failed — also limited land-use regulation; Washington I-933 (2006), 41.18%, failed — regulatory takings only; Idaho Proposition 2 (2006), 23.94%, failed — regulatory-takings compensation in title; California Proposition 98 (June 2008), 38.49%, failed — also abolished rent control; Arizona Proposition 207 (2006), 64.80%, passed — bundled with regulatory-takings compensation. ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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H.R. 4128, Private Property Rights Protection Act, passed Nov. 3, 2005, 376–38 — R 218–2, D 157–36, I 1–0 — Clerk of the House, Roll 568; H.Res. 340 disapproving Kelo passed June 30, 2005, 365–33 — R 220–1, D 144–32 — Roll 361. ↩
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H.R. 1433 (112th), passed by voice vote Feb. 28, 2012 — GovTrack; H.R. 1944, passed Feb. 26, 2014, 353–65 — R 226–0, D 127–65 — Clerk of the House, Roll 67; H.R. 1689 (115th), passed by voice vote July 23, 2018 — GovTrack. Mechanism: two-year cutoff of federal economic-development funds plus a private right of action; none passed the Senate — House Report 115-859. ↩ ↩2
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Iowa Poll, Selzer & Co. for the Des Moines Register, March 5–8, 2023, n=805 adults: 78% oppose companies using eminent domain for carbon-capture pipelines — 72% R / 82% D / 79% I — via Yahoo News. ↩
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Zogby International for the American Farm Bureau Federation, Oct. 29–Nov. 2, 2005: 95% disagreed with the Kelo ruling and 2% agreed; party crosstabs 92% R / 94% D / 99% I — reported in House Report 113-357, crosstabs in Somin, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100 (2009), tbl.1; question wording: taking property “of one citizen and give it to another citizen to use for private development.” Embold Research for Bold Alliance, July 25–31, 2024, n=2,479 registered voters in IL, IN, IA, NE, ND, SD: 81% oppose, no party split — Pipeline Fighters Hub. ↩
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Saint Index, August 2007, on two questions inserted at the researcher’s request: 21% could correctly say whether their own state had passed post-Kelo reform; 13% both knew and correctly judged whether it was effective; no party breakdown published. Topline on file with the author and cited through Somin, “The Limits of Backlash,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100 (2009), full text. ↩
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Monmouth University Poll, New Jersey adults, n=800, Sept. 21–26, 2005: 47% agree / 39% disagree “there are times when it is O.K. to use eminent domain to rebuild an area”; taking “low value homes from people in order to build a shopping center” acceptable to 4% (7% for higher-value homes); “vacant and run-down buildings” for a shopping center 55%; for a school 88%; 40% had heard nothing about eminent domain — Monmouth University Polling Institute. ↩ ↩2
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Garrett amendment to H.R. 3058 (FY2006 Transportation-Treasury-HUD appropriation), June 30, 2005, barring funds for takings for private economic development: 231–189 — R 192–31, D 39–157 — Clerk of the House, Roll 350; enacted as §726 of the appropriation per Institute for Justice. ↩
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Iowa’s legislature overrode Gov. Tom Vilsack’s veto on July 14, 2006 — House 90–8, Senate 41–8, the state’s first override in more than forty years; legislators of both parties spoke and voted on both sides, including the Senate Democratic leader voting to override a governor of his own party — Radio Iowa; Institute for Justice, Enacted Legislation Since Kelo; Mississippi Initiative 31 passed 73.06% in 2011 over Gov. Haley Barbour’s opposition — Ballotpedia; Ohio’s unanimous 2005 moratorium and Norwood v. Horney, 2006-Ohio-3799. ↩
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“43 states reformed” — Institute for Justice (advocacy source) and House Report 113-357; 45 states, New York never reformed — Somin, State Court Report (2025); 36 state legislatures enacted reform laws, 22 of them “largely symbolic,” and the 11 states reforming by popular referendum produced markedly stronger laws, strongest where citizen-initiated — Somin, “The Limits of Backlash,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2100 (2009), full text; Utah’s 2007 HB 365 rollback — Institute for Justice list. ↩ ↩2
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Executive Order 13406 (June 23, 2006) limits federal takings to those “for the purpose of benefiting the general public and not merely for the purpose of advancing the economic interest of private parties to be given ownership or use of the property taken” — American Presidency Project. ↩
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Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissenting from denial of certiorari in Eychaner v. City of Chicago, No. 20-1214 (July 2, 2021) — SCOTUSblog; review denied again in Bowers Development, LLC v. Oneida County IDA, No. 24-670 (March 24, 2025) — SCOTUSblog. ↩