Candidate category · Remedy unpolled since 2018
FBI / DOJ independence
The only structural remedy ever polled — judicial approval before a special counsel is fired — drew 44% of Republicans and 76% of Democrats (Monmouth, 2018); no independent poll has asked about the remedy since.
The proposal
The idea as commonly framed would insulate federal criminal law enforcement from presidential direction, in three forms: an independent constitutional status for the Department of Justice, whose top officers could not be removed without cause or Senate concurrence; removal protection alone — a for-cause standard for the Attorney General, FBI Director, special counsels, and inspectors general; or a conduct rule barring any president from directing an investigation or prosecution of a named person for a purpose unrelated to law enforcement. Nothing in our slate reaches prosecutorial direction: executive compliance binds the executive to court orders, and pardon reform governs a prosecution after the fact.
The evidence
One structural mechanism has been polled with a party breakdown. Asked in 2018 whether to require “the approval of a panel of federal judges before any special counsel could be fired by the president or attorney general,” 62% supported and 29% opposed — 44% of Republicans, 65% of independents, and 76% of Democrats (Monmouth University Poll, 2018).1
Two other 2018 readings complete the remedy record. Letting a fired special counsel appeal to a panel of federal judges drew 57%: 39% of Republicans, 58% of independents, and 71% of Democrats (Monmouth University Poll, 2018).2 Legislation to protect the special counsel from being fired drew 52%: 33% of Republicans and 75% of Democrats (CBS News/SSRS, 2018).3 No independent national poll since 2018 has asked whether the Attorney General should be independent of the President, the FBI Director removable only for cause, or prosecutors protected from removal.
The diagnosis is polled often. In May 2026, 55% said the Justice Department has filed unjustified criminal cases against the President’s political opponents — 53% of Republicans, 55% of independents, and 58% of Democrats, “little difference in partisan perception” (Marquette Law School Poll, 2026).4 The same survey found 77% of Republicans calling the 2022–24 prosecutions of the sitting president unjustified and 86% of Democrats calling them justified.4 Wording that named the sitting president as the actor found 52% unjustified — 6% of Republicans, 58% of independents, and 92% of Democrats (Quinnipiac University, 2025).5 Advocacy polling: 60% disagreed that the President “should be able to direct the Justice Department to pursue charges against his political opponents” — 36% of Republicans, 53% of independents, and 86% of Democrats (States United Democracy Center/YouGov, 2026).6
Where it stands
The bipartisan floor is 39–44% of Republicans (Monmouth, 2018): Weak, unpolled since, and never tested against a named cost. At risk on:
- Abuse-vs-remedy gap. 53% of Republicans and 58% of Democrats agree unjustified cases have been filed (Marquette, 2026); the three polls that named a mechanism found 44%, 39%, and 33% of Republicans (Monmouth and CBS/SSRS, 2018).
- Support flips with who holds power. Favorable views of the Department rose 18 points in a year among Republicans and Republican leaners, to 51%, and fell 27 among Democrats and Democratic leaners, to 28% (Pew Research Center, 2025).7 The same survey shows the pattern on a second institution: the FBI stands at 48% favorable and 36% unfavorable overall — 54% of Republicans and Republican leaners favorable against 34% unfavorable, and 45% of Democrats and Democratic leaners favorable against 39% unfavorable (Pew Research Center, 2025) — where Pew’s pre-2020 telephone series found relatively modest partisan gaps on the FBI.8
- Framing dependency. Marquette (53% R, 2026) and Quinnipiac (6% R, 2025) asked the same diagnosis and landed 47 points apart.
The existential-problem test is met: 77% of Republicans call the 2022–24 prosecutions of the current president unjustified while 86% of Democrats call them justified, and majorities of both — 53% of Republicans, 58% of Democrats — call the Justice Department’s cases against that president’s opponents unjustified (Marquette, 2026).4 Symmetry is met by construction — a for-cause standard binds every future president identically — though each party currently reads “independence” through the incumbent. Why-an-amendment is met decisively. In 2024 the Supreme Court placed prosecutorial decisionmaking within an authority that “Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine.”9 In June 2026 it held a statutory for-cause removal provision “contrary to the separation of powers” and overruled the 1935 precedent behind such protections.10 The contrary authority, a 1988 decision upholding for-cause removal of an independent counsel, rests on a statute that lapsed in 1999.11
Framings we tested
Two framings clear the bar; neither is a remedy. The diagnosis (53% of Republicans, 58% of Democrats, Marquette, 2026) describes conduct, not a rule. Statutory removal protection at multimember agencies drew 73% — 54% of Republicans, 72% of independents, and 93% of Democrats (Marquette, 2026) — but concerns regulatory commissioners, not prosecutors.4 No remedy framing clears — 44% and 39% of Republicans (Monmouth, 2018), 33% (CBS/SSRS, 2018) — and softening the mechanism lowered the floor. Naming the President rather than the Department as the actor moves Republicans from 53% to 6% (Marquette, 2026; Quinnipiac, 2025), so the diagnosis is not stable enough to build on. The question a draft would need — for-cause removal of the Attorney General and FBI Director, asked about any future president — has never been asked.
What would move it
Toward acceptance: an independent national poll fielded in 2026 or later asking, of any future president, whether the Attorney General or FBI Director may be removed only for cause rather than at will, and whether the president may be barred from directing the Justice Department to investigate or prosecute a specific person for reasons unrelated to law enforcement — with an actor-named control arm and a costs-named follow-up. The bar: 60% of Republicans on the conduct rule, 55% on removal, holding through the follow-up. A cross-party state ballot majority insulating a state attorney general would corroborate.
Toward rejection: Republican support for removal in the 30s or low 40s while the diagnosis polls in the 50s — the 2018 pattern on fresh data — fails the abuse-vs-remedy and framing-dependency tests; forward-looking wording that drops both parties below the incumbent-named readings fails as regime-coded.
Sources
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“Would you support or oppose requiring the approval of a panel of federal judges before any special counsel could be fired by the president or attorney general?”: 62% support / 29% oppose — 44% R (47% oppose) / 65% I / 76% D; n=806 adults, Jan. 28–30, 2018 — Monmouth University Poll. ↩
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Allowing a fired special counsel “to file an appeal with a panel of federal judges who would then decide if there is just cause for the firing”: 57% support / 27% oppose — 39% R (43% oppose) / 58% I / 71% D; n=803 adults, April 26–30, 2018 — Monmouth University Poll. ↩
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Congress should pass legislation to protect the special counsel from being fired: 52% support — 33% R (67% opposed) / 75% D, independents in the majority; n=1,103 adults, Nov. 15–18, 2018 — CBS News / SSRS. ↩
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Justice Department has filed unjustified criminal cases against the President’s political opponents: 55% unjustified / 45% justified — 53% R / 55% I / 58% D, unchanged overall since November 2025; the 2022–24 cases against the current President: 45% unjustified overall, 77% R unjustified vs. 86% D justified; statutes can set removal requirements at multimember agencies: 73% — 54% R / 72% I / 93% D; n=1,001 adults, May 20–26, 2026 — Marquette Law School Poll, release PDF; the same item in Nov. 5–12, 2025 (n=1,052): 55% unjustified — 48% R / 47% I / 65% D — Marquette Law School Poll. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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“Do you think President Trump is using the U.S. Justice Department to file unjustified criminal charges against his political opponents, or do you think the charges against his political opponents are justified under the law?”: 52% unjustified / 38% justified — 6% R / 58% I / 92% D; n=1,327 registered voters, Oct. 16–20, 2025 — Quinnipiac University Poll, release PDF. ↩
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The President “should be able to direct the Justice Department to pursue charges against his political opponents”: 60% disagree / 16% agree — 36% R disagree (30% agree) / 53% I / 86% D; n=1,537 adults, May 19–29, 2026; advocacy-commissioned, YouGov fieldwork — States United Democracy Center / YouGov. ↩
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Justice Department favorability: 39% favorable / 46% unfavorable; 51% of Republicans and Republican leaners favorable, up 18 points in a year; 28% of Democrats and Democratic leaners, down 27 points; n=3,554 adults (DOJ item n=1,784), Aug. 4–10, 2025 — Pew Research Center; full report PDF. ↩
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FBI favorability: 48% favorable / 36% unfavorable overall (51/33 in July 2024; 52/36 in March 2023) — 54% of Republicans and Republican leaners favorable / 34% unfavorable; 45% of Democrats and Democratic leaners favorable / 39% unfavorable; Pew reports “relatively modest partisan gaps in evaluations of the FBI” in its pre-2020 telephone series; n=3,554 adults (FBI item n=1,770), Aug. 4–10, 2025 — Pew Research Center, full report PDF. ↩
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“[I]nvestigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is ‘the special province of the Executive Branch’”; the Executive has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” over which crimes to investigate, within a “conclusive and preclusive” authority that “Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine” — Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (July 1, 2024), slip opinion. ↩
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The FTC’s for-cause removal provision held “contrary to the separation of powers”; of the 1935 precedent, “If anything more is left of Humphrey’s, we overrule it” — Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25–332 (June 29, 2026), slip opinion; see also Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197 (2020). ↩
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For-cause removal of an independent counsel upheld 7–1; the statute lapsed in 1999 — Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). ↩