Restore the power to set reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limits on election money, guarantee the right to know who funds it, and allow bans on foreign money.
The problem
Over five decades, the Supreme Court has removed, piece by piece, the power to
limit money in federal elections. Buckley v. Valeo (1976) struck down all
limits on campaign spending.1Citizens United (2010) extended unlimited
spending to corporate treasuries,2 and SpeechNow (2010) created the super
PAC.3McCutcheon (2014) struck aggregate contribution limits and narrowed
“corruption” to outright vote-buying — influence, access, and gratitude no
longer count.4 In June 2026, NRSC v. FEC struck the limits on
coordinated party spending as well, and said again that preventing outright
bribery is the only interest the Court will recognize.5 When Montana defended its ban on corporate political spending,
enacted by voters in 1912 after mining magnates bought the state legislature
and upheld for ninety-eight years, the Court reversed in 2012 without hearing
argument.6
On this question the United States is a genuine outlier. Canada’s Supreme
Court upheld spending limits as essential to a “level playing field.”7
The United Kingdom caps party and outside spending by statute.8 Germany
writes party-finance transparency into its constitution;9 France bans
corporate donations outright.10 Roughly 46% of the world’s countries cap
candidate spending.11 American doctrine alone holds that
electoral fairness is a constitutionally forbidden reason to limit campaign
money — in Buckley’s words, “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”1
That closes every other path. States cannot experiment: Montana tried, and
was summarily reversed.6 Congress cannot legislate around a constitutional
holding. Only an amendment reaches it.
The principle
Six sections that restore authority and name a purpose — without
prescribing any campaign finance system. The first three are the For Our
Freedom Amendment, American Promise’s text, adopted word for word save one
added sentence;12 the last three are this project’s additions:
Power to set reasonable limits. Congress and the states may set
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limits on the raising and spending of money in
elections — contributions and expenditures both, which is what closes the
super-PAC channel. The words “reasonable” and “viewpoint-neutral” are in the
text, not left to doctrine, and courts keep the power of review. Abroad, they
use it: a British £5 spending cap13 and an Ontario year-long restriction14 were
both struck down by courts that otherwise accept limits. Limits written by
incumbents to entrench incumbents have not survived review elsewhere, and
would face the same review here.
A named purpose. Political equality and the independence of government
from concentrated wealth are declared legitimate constitutional ends — the
answer to Buckley’s rationale, not just its result. This is the ground
every peer democracy already occupies. The clause operates only through the
limits in Section 2; it is not a freestanding power over speech.
The right to know. The Court has upheld disclosure 8–1,2 yet the major
disclosure bill has passed the House and died by Senate filibuster three
times.15 Framing disclosure as a right of the people makes sunlight the
default rather than a regulatory option. “Substantial” keeps the amendment
aimed at big money — thresholds and protections for small donors and
threatened groups stay in statute.
Artificial entities, in election spending only. Legislatures may treat
corporate and human election money differently — the choice Montana’s voters
made in 191216 — without deciding anything about corporate rights generally.
Power to keep foreign money out. Congress and the states may bar
foreign governments, foreign nationals, and entities they own or control from
contributing or spending to influence American elections. Federal law already
bans foreign nationals from candidate elections, but the Supreme Court has
expressly left open whether that reaches foreign-controlled domestic
companies, and the states act under a patchwork of statutes. The text names
the class and grants the power; the definitions of ownership and control —
the machinery a court struck down in Maine’s 2023 law — stay in statute where
they can be tuned. This is the one part of the category that moves through
Congress on a voice vote.
A press shield. The amendment protects press activity — news
reporting, commentary, editorial content — regardless of how the speaker is
organized. Paid advertising is regulable spending; journalism is not. That
is the line every peer democracy draws.
The draft text
Sections 1–3 are the For Our Freedom Amendment as published by American
Promise, adopted word for word, with one sentence added at the end of
Section 2.12 Sections 4–6 — disclosure, foreign money, and the
press-and-speech savings clause — are this project’s additions.
Section 1. We the People have compelling sovereign interests in the freedom of speech, representative self-government, federalism, the integrity of the electoral process, and the political equality of natural persons.
What this means
American Promise’s opening section regulates nothing by itself: it names the interests the article serves — with the freedom of speech named first — and declares them compelling. That answers the Supreme Court’s reasoning, which since 1976 has treated electoral fairness as a forbidden ground for limiting campaign money, and it does so in the words a cross-partisan movement has carried through state resolutions for a decade.
Section 2. Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to forbid Congress or the States, within their respective jurisdictions, from reasonably regulating and limiting contributions and spending in campaigns, elections, or ballot measures. Laws enacted under this article shall be viewpoint-neutral.
What this means
The operating clause, in American Promise’s words: it removes the constitutional barrier to regulating and limiting money — contributions and spending both, which is what closes the super-PAC channel, and in ballot-measure campaigns as well as candidate elections. “Reasonably” keeps courts in the game against limits incumbents write to entrench themselves. The second sentence is this project’s addition: every law under the article must be viewpoint-neutral, the express answer to the fear that limits become a tool against disfavored speakers.
Section 3. Congress and the States shall have the power to implement and enforce this article by appropriate legislation and may distinguish between natural persons and artificial entities, including by prohibiting artificial entities from raising and spending money in campaigns, elections, or ballot measures.
What this means
The enforcement power, joined to the artificial-entity rule: legislatures may treat money from corporations and other artificial entities differently from money from human beings — up to prohibition, the choice Montana’s voters made in 1912 — but only in election fundraising and spending. Nothing here decides what rights corporations hold generally, which avoids the corporate-personhood trap, where “corporations are not people” text strips protections from nonprofits, churches, unions, and newspapers.
Section 4. The people shall have the right to know, in a timely manner, the source of substantial contributions and expenditures made to influence elections or the appointment of public officials, as provided by law.
What this means
This section makes it a right of the people to learn, in time to matter, who is behind large sums spent to influence elections or appointments. Disclosure is already permitted under current doctrine but has stalled in Congress for years; writing it as a right, on a state model courts have upheld, turns sunlight from an option into an enforceable default. “Substantial” and “as provided by law” answer the donor-privacy trap: thresholds, timing, and exemptions for threatened groups stay in statute, so the clause reaches big money only.
Section 5. Congress and the States may prohibit foreign governments, foreign nationals, and any entity owned or controlled by them from contributing or spending money to influence elections in the United States, including elections on ballot measures.
What this means
This section lets Congress and the states bar foreign governments, foreign nationals, and the entities they own or control from putting money into American elections, ballot measures included. Federal law already bans foreign nationals from candidate elections, but the Supreme Court has left open whether that reaches domestic companies under foreign control; this text settles the question and gives the states the same power. It names the class and stops there — the tailoring trap: ownership thresholds and definitions of control are machinery courts strike when set too broadly, and belong in statute.
Section 6. Nothing in this article shall be construed to grant any power to abridge the freedom of speech or of the press, including news reporting, commentary, and editorial content, regardless of the speaker’s form of organization; nor shall any law held invalid before the ratification of this article be revived by it.
What this means
A savings clause: nothing in the amendment grants power to abridge speech or the press, and it protects press activity — reporting, commentary, editorial content — however the speaker is organized. That functional line, drawn by every peer democracy, makes paid advertising regulable spending while journalism is not, and shields the pamphleteer and the newspaper alike. The clause on invalidated laws means the article does not silently revive statutes struck under the doctrine it replaces; legislatures must enact anew, in the open. Enforcement power lives in Section 3.
Why it can pass
The public has never split on this the way the parties have. Limits and
disclosure poll as full-spectrum consensus, with single-digit partisan gaps:1718
Limits on the money individuals and organizations can spend on campaigns — Pew Research Center, 2023Requiring dark-money groups to disclose their donors — Brennan Center, 2026
Keeping foreign money out is the broadest consensus of all. Maine voters
barred foreign-government election spending 86–14 in 2023; a bill extending
the federal foreign-national ban to ballot measures passed the House by
unanimous voice vote in July 2026; and asked directly, Americans favor a ban
by nearly identical margins in both parties:
Ban foreign individuals and entities from spending to influence ballot measures — University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation, 2021
The amendment itself polls at 71% (72% of Republicans, 76% of Democrats, 74%
of independents — Ipsos for American Promise, 2025).19 That survey was
commissioned by the amendment’s chief advocacy group; advocacy-commissioned
polls on this issue run several points above independent ones, and both find
supermajorities.
The record among officeholders is harder, and we state it plainly. The only Senate floor
vote ever held on such an amendment failed in 2014, 54–42, with every
Democrat voting yes and every Republican voting no.20 But the votes taken
closest to the voters point the other way:
Twenty-five state legislatures have formally called on Congress to
propose a money-in-politics amendment — including Oklahoma and Idaho, which
passed their resolutions with near-unanimous support in 2026, and
Missouri’s House, which passed unanimously.21 Thirteen more states would be
needed to ratify.
Montana and Colorado put the question on the ballot in 2012: Montana’s
I-166 passed with 75% and Colorado’s Amendment 65 with 74% — one state
voting Republican for president by double digits that year, the other
Democratic — both instructing their delegations to pursue this amendment.22
In 2026 a Republican member introduced an aligned amendment resolution
in the House for the first time — early evidence that the party line
in Congress is beginning to follow the electorate.23
If it passes: the law today and the day after
This amendment grants powers and names purposes; it repeals no statute of its own force. (How ratified amendments interact with existing law in general is covered in After ratification.)
Federal law today
The Federal Election Campaign Act still sets base contribution limits, requires committees to report contributors above $200, bans direct corporate and union contributions, and bars foreign nationals from federal, state, and local elections.24252627 Other provisions remain printed in the Code but have been held unconstitutional: the corporate expenditure ban after Citizens United, aggregate limits after McCutcheon, and coordinated party limits after NRSC; the FEC withdrew the first two sets of regulations in 2014.24528 After Buckley, Congress rewrote the statute to the new doctrine in 1976.29 Federal law preempts state law for federal elections.30
State law today
Twelve states set no limit on individual contributions to state candidates; twenty-three prohibit corporate contributions.31 Thirty states bar foreign contributions in candidate elections and twenty-five in ballot-measure campaigns.32 Colorado’s constitution still forbids corporate spending that expressly advocates for or against a candidate, but a state statute now provides that, notwithstanding that clause, corporations may make independent expenditures; Missouri’s constitution caps contributions and bars corporate giving; Montana narrowed its 1912 ban to direct contributions in 2015.333435 No state law conflicts with the draft, because every operative section grants power rather than imposing a rule.
The day after
Nothing on the books becomes unenforceable. What ends is the constitutional force of Buckley’s expenditure rule, of Citizens United as a barrier to legislation, and of the rule that preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance is the only interest a legislature may pursue.125 Section 1 works from ratification: courts must treat the interests it names — the freedom of speech, representative self-government, federalism, electoral integrity, and the political equality of natural persons — as compelling. Sections 2, 3, and 5 grant powers; nothing changes until Congress or a state legislates. Section 4’s right to know exists “as provided by law,” so existing disclosure statutes are the law on day one, and any expansion must be enacted. Section 3 gives Congress and the states the power to implement and enforce the article. Provisions struck under superseded doctrine remain in the Code, and Section 6 says the article does not revive them — they return only if re-enacted. The courts are left the meaning of “reasonably,” whether Section 4’s right to know reaches ballot-measure campaigns (Sections 2, 3, and 5 name ballot measures expressly), and how far a state may reach into federal races.3630 A 2026 Virginia bill shows the trigger form: limits effective only on the Attorney General’s certification that a Supreme Court opinion or a constitutional amendment made them likely to be upheld.37
What we left out
What we considered and set aside, and why:
“Corporations are not people” and “money is not speech.” The other
major drafting approach would strip constitutional rights from all artificial
entities and direct courts never to treat election spending as speech.38 The
slogan polls well — it is why Montana’s I-166 reached 75%22 — but the text
reaches every incorporated body: nonprofits, churches, unions, and
newspapers, and removes due-process protection from businesses generally.
It converts a consensus issue into a fight over corporate legal status. The
narrow entity clause in Section 3 does the election-money work without the
spillover.
Public financing of campaigns. The weakest remedy in the polling —
about 50% support (Gallup, 2013)39 — and machinery rather than principle:
the countries that use it revise the design constantly.9 The amendment
permits it and does not prescribe it.
Dollar figures in constitutional text. Spending limits are written by
incumbents, and low limits favor incumbents — challengers must buy the
name recognition officeholders get free. Frozen constitutional numbers
would turn a clause meant to protect elections into one that protects
incumbents. “Reasonable”
plus judicial review is the field-tested mitigation.1314
Detailed disclosure rules. Compelled disclosure has its own
constitutional counter-tradition — the Court has protected membership
lists and donor lists from blanket exposure,40 and small donors to
controversial causes face real harassment risk. The amendment guarantees
sunlight on substantial money; thresholds, timing, and exemptions for
threatened groups belong in statute.
Details that belong in statute: regulated-period lengths, coordination
and independence definitions, foreign-money enforcement, and the
enforcement agency’s design. Peer democracies show independent enforcement
matters more than rule stringency — and none of them specifies the agency
in constitutional text.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), overruled Austin and part of McConnell, permitting unlimited corporate independent expenditures while upholding disclosure and disclaimer requirements 8–1 — Justia, 558 U.S. 310; see also the FEC case page. ↩↩2↩3↩4
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), struck aggregate contribution limits 5–4 and narrowed the cognizable government interest to quid pro quo corruption — Justia, 572 U.S. 185. ↩↩2
NRSC v. FEC (June 30, 2026, 6–3, Kavanaugh, J.), striking FECA’s coordinated-party-expenditure limits and overruling Colorado II (2001); the majority reaffirmed quid pro quo corruption as the only permissible interest — FEC summary; Skadden analysis. ↩↩2↩3
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock (2012), per curiam summary reversal of the Montana Supreme Court’s decision upholding the state’s 1912 Corrupt Practices Act, decided without briefing on the merits or oral argument — Cornell Legal Information Institute, No. 11-1179; see also the FEC case page. ↩↩2
The For Our Freedom Amendment as published by American Promise; the version introduced in Congress as H.J.Res. 191 (119th Congress) arranges the same provisions differently — American Promise. ↩↩2
Bowman v. United Kingdom (ECtHR 1998) struck a £5 limit on independent expenditure as “a total barrier” to expression while accepting that spending limits pursue the legitimate aim of equality between candidates; PPERA was designed around it — legislation.gov.uk, PPERA explanatory notes referencing Bowman. ↩↩2
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Working Families Coalition, 2025 SCC 5, struck Ontario’s extension of third-party spending limits to a full year before elections — CanLII, 2025 SCC 5. ↩↩2
71% support (72% of Republicans, 76% of Democrats, 74% of independents) for the For Our Freedom amendment; Ipsos probability panel — Ipsos for American Promise, July 2025 (advocacy-commissioned by American Promise, the amendment’s chief advocacy group). Advocacy polls on this issue run roughly 5–10 points above independent ones (Pew, 72%); both find supermajorities. ↩
H.J.Res. 191 (119th Congress), the For Our Freedom Amendment, introduced by Rep. Tom Barrett (R-MI) in June 2026 — the first Republican-introduced version — Congress.gov, H.J.Res. 191 text. ↩
52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1) sets base contribution limits (statutory text $2,000 per election to a candidate and $25,000 per year to a national party, indexed); the aggregate limits in (a)(3), the coordinated party expenditure limits in (d), and the loan-repayment cap in (j) remain in the Code although held unconstitutional — Cornell Legal Information Institute, 52 U.S.C. § 30116. ↩
52 U.S.C. § 30104 requires committees to identify contributors above $200 per year, persons making independent expenditures above $250 to file statements, and electioneering-communication spenders above $10,000 to file within 24 hours — Cornell Legal Information Institute, 52 U.S.C. § 30104. ↩
52 U.S.C. § 30121 bars foreign nationals from contributions, expenditures, independent expenditures, and electioneering communications in connection with federal, state, or local elections, excluding lawful permanent residents; upheld in Bluman v. FEC — Cornell Legal Information Institute, 52 U.S.C. § 30121; FEC case page, Bluman v. FEC. ↩
30 states prohibit foreign contributions in candidate elections and 25 in ballot-measure campaigns; two bar foreign independent expenditures — Ballotpedia News, July 21, 2026. ↩
Colorado Constitution art. XXVIII, § 3(4)(a) (Amendment 27, 2002) makes it “unlawful for a corporation or labor organization to make contributions to a candidate committee or a political party, and to make expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate”; C.R.S. § 1-45-107.5(2) provides that “notwithstanding sections 3(4)(a) and 6(2) of article XXVIII of the state constitution, corporations and labor organizations shall not be prohibited from making independent expenditures” — FindLaw, Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 3; FindLaw, C.R.S. § 1-45-107.5. ↩
Missouri Constitution art. VIII, § 23 (Amendment 2, adopted November 8, 2016) caps individual contributions at $2,600 per election and makes it “unlawful for a corporation or labor organization to make contributions to a campaign committee” — Missouri Revisor of Statutes, Mo. Const. art. VIII, § 23. ↩
Montana Code Annotated 13-35-227(1), as amended by Ch. 259, L. 2015: “A corporation or union may not make a contribution to a candidate directly or through an intermediary” — Montana Legislature, MCA 13-35-227. ↩
The We the People Amendment, H.J.Res. 54 (119th Congress), provides that constitutional rights are “the rights of natural persons only,” that artificial entities “shall have no rights under this Constitution,” and that spending money to influence elections shall not be construed as speech — Congress.gov, H.J.Res. 54 text; Move to Amend (advocacy source). ↩
NAACP v. Alabama (1958) protected membership lists from compelled disclosure to hostile officials, and Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta (2021) struck California’s blanket donor-disclosure requirement on associational grounds — Oyez, Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, No. 19-251. ↩